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	Subscribing to the value of critical reflection in everyday life and in research practices, it is only rarely that one encounters a book able to remind oneself of the immense magnitude and strength of one’s own socialisation and the culturally embedded values of contemporary society. With his book “A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” C.F. Goodey manages to do precisely that.
Using a historical approach Goodey persuasively deconstructs the contemporary notion of borders between intelligence-based in-groups and out-groups. In doing so, he launches a fundamental and multi-level critique of psychology stating that psychology is not really interested in people per se, but only people “as parts and props of a vulnerable institutional order which she [the psychologist] will help to police and of which intelligence is the supreme membership criterion” (p. 5). According to Goodey, psychology feeds on the wrongly held assumption “that intelligence and its disabilities are more or less stable concepts with some core that survives importation across the borders of historical enquiry” (p. 10).
The groundwork of this both exogenous and endogenous analysis of the history of psychology contains thought-provoking contributions in the fields of history, sociology, history of science, psychology, philosophy, ethics, and to some extent philology. This is bound to generate wide interest in different research environments and among students working with psychology, intelligence and disability.
In spite of its subtitle “The Shaping of Psychology in Early Modern Europe”, the study does not limit itself to a perspective on early modern Europe. In fact, the study contains abundant discussions and perspectives pertaining to modern psychology throwing new and critical light on modern paradigms of psychology in general and psychometrics in particular.
The starting point
Goodey begins by proposing that “intelligence and intellectual disability, likewise intelligent and intellectually disabled people, are not natural kinds but historically contingent forms of human self-representation and social reciprocity, of relatively recent historical origin” (p. 2), he challenges the accepted wisdom that “intelligence” and “intellectual disability” describe natural, trans-historical realities.  As such, Goodey has an unerring eye for the shifts in the genesis of modern psychology.
But this does not mean that Goodey views intellectual disability as a mere social construction. Instead he meticulously demonstrates the historical contingencies of notions of human ability and the crossroads associated with them. The endeavour is to contribute to the understanding of the underlying concepts legitimising social rejection and distaste. In his research endeavour, Goodey enters a minefield of strong opinions and research traditions (see e.g. Garsdal & Ydesen 2009), exploring the “ideological collusion” inherent in the claims to universality of psychometric methods.
Summary of Main Parts
The book is organized into eight well-structured parts. This makes it easy for the reader to follow the arguments, although it would have been beneficial to have some clear summaries after each chapter as well as a concluding chapter.
In Part One, Goodey addresses problematic intellects in ancient Greece. A core message in this part is that Plato and Aristotle are not ancestors but outsiders in the history of modern psychological concepts (p. 16). Interpreting numerous classical writings, Goodey persuasively argues that in the Greek world the slave’s natural difference was not determined by biology but technology (p. 28). The inference rests on the insight that in the ancient Greek world nature and necessity did not overlap. Moreover, Aristotle did not connect human essence with cerebral operations (p. 34).
Part Two explores the relationship between socio-economic structures and intelligence and disability.  Goodey argues that the idea of intelligence specific to human beings was sown during the twelfth-century beginnings of modern capitalism. In an analysis that induces at least some connotations to Max Weber’s “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, Goodey demonstrates how quick thinking became “(…) ingrained in the administrative structures of Western European capitalism.” (p. 39). In this respect Goodey’s points might find strong support in the recent work of German sociologist Hartmut Rosa on the origins of “high-speed society” (Rosa 2010).
In Part Three titled “Intelligence and Disability: Status and Power” the main point is that “Intelligence is…the same kind of thing as honour and grace: it belongs to the class of claims to status that are purely self-referential.  The resemblance between honour, grace and intelligence is found in the fact that the king disburses honourable titles, God dispenses grace, and the psychologist allocates IQ scores.” (p. 64). The main implications of this argument are that societal ideals – bound to honour, grace or intelligence - form a totality able to legitimise behaviour and at the same time enable state power to bind individuals to the social order. Social exclusion tools are crucial to this structuring of societal ideals such that “although this authority is in fact arbitrary, in receiving its blessing we abnegate our right to question it, thereby binding ourselves to accept practices which a different generation, in different historical circumstances, might regard as utterly wrong” (p. 65).
The arbitrary nature of these social selection mechanisms is perhaps one of the most disturbing and thought-provoking aspects of Goodey’s analysis. Goodey notes that arbitrary criteria were at the very centre of the definition of problem children in Alfred Binet’s work pointing out that “Naming a general category – intelligence, for example – and putting some abilities into it, while excluding others is at root another kind of thought, to which the idea of empirical verification is irrelevant. They do not belong together. The first is a judgement, the second a sorting of terms. The confusion between those two entirely different types of thought process is key. To clear it up would not be to relativize intelligence but to annihilate it. Yet abandoning a concept so socially powerful requires a revolution” (p. 74).
In Part Four the main concern is how the older status modes of honour and grace and their corresponding concepts of disability feed into the modern status mode of intelligence. In this respect Goodey argues that: “Heraldic devices bear a functional resemblance to psychometric scores.” (p. 106), the main point being that: “The difference between aristocracy and meritocracy is not between less and more social mobility, but between two different ways of closing off privilege and passing it on to one’s offspring” (p. 104).
Part Five explores in detail the religious components of psychology. An important step from religion to psychology is the changed connotations of ability taking place in the early modern era. Goodey pinpoints the “search for signs of grace and election” as having “ushered human intelligence in by the back door”. The shift from grace to intelligence is among other places evident in the strong focus on catechism learning ability in European schools combining grace with notions of intelligence. At the end of the day, intelligence demonstrates a superior claim to divinity.
Part Six is about fools and their medical histories. In this part, Goodey analyses the social construction of the diagnosis of ADHD. The argument runs that it is very much like the social construction of intelligence. .
Part Seven is about what Goodey calls “psychology, biology, and the ethics of exceptionalism”. This part raises the point that psychology has failed to root out the religious debris permeating the fundamental values of the profession itself. 
Finally, in Part Eight, Goodey brings together his many mentions of John Locke in the previous parts and shows how Locke viewed the optimum human ability as abstraction. This placed mathematical skills in a higher order than other mental operations, and had enormous influence on the subsequent construction of intelligence tests. Another important contribution creating leverage and latitude for the development of modern psychology was Locke’s notion of nominal essences. While recognising that only God knows true essences, Locke made the argument that human beings can advance nominal essences, thus creating a leeway for creating categories based on notions of human intelligence.
Inspiring further research
This momentous work raises a number of follow-up questions apt for conducting much thought-provoking and important research. 
It is doubtful that Goodey’s arguments will create common understanding in the contested field since so many different approaches and interests are active; perhaps this was never Goodey’s intention. However, a possible way to work in that direction would be to position the analysis in relation to state-of-the-art research on intelligence testing (e.g. Phelps 2008) and paradigmatic work on creating common ground in intelligence research (e.g. Neisser 1996).
How does the picture look if the study is broadened geographically? Goodey focused on England, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Italy, but Eastern Europe, Germany and Scandinavia are conspicuous by their absence not to mention other continents than Europe. An elaboration and operationalization of the intercultural dimensions of intelligence and intellectual disability and a discussion of the sense of equality in different modern nation states and how it was developed in relation to historical status modes would be most invigorating.
Another angle for follow-up research is the spatial descriptions of the transfers and translations of ideas and notions conducive to the development of modern psychology. Goodey mentions the common cultural space shared between the gentry and merchants in England and the nobility and bourgeoisie in France. However, the space is never operationalized and Goodey draws no clear picture of it.
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